No End in Sight

This
powerful documentary exposes the Bush administration's lack of a plan to rebuild Iraq. If there is one movie you need to see on the reasons for the U.S. quagmire
in Iraq, this is it.

Wrenching account of U.S. errors in Iraq
By Carrie Rickey
Inquirer Movie Critic

'We used to joke that there were 500 ways to do it wrong," says Barbara Bodine,
American diplomat and former coordinator for central Iraq, of how the
United States could rebuild the Middle Eastern nation after the fall of
Saddam Hussein. "And only two or three ways to do it right."

No End in Sight, Charles Ferguson's lucid, concise and devastating account
of what went wrong in Iraq, patiently counts those 500 ways.

The result is a heartbreaking, soul-searching chronicle of how America
snatched defeat from the jaws of victory in a nation where outraged
citizens look into Ferguson's camera and testify, "Saddam was awful,
but the Americans are worse!"

Muqtada al-Sadr, shown in newsreel footage inciting anti-American insurgents, makes a similar distinction between the old authoritarian rule and the American occupying forces:Hussein was the "little Satan," America the "great Satan." It could
have been otherwise, Ferguson suggests. The Iraqis may have regarded
Americans more like avenging angels had the Bush administration heeded
the advice of its Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA).

Narrated by Campbell Scott with a neutrality that makes its content all the more
incendiary, No End focuses its attention on May 2003, after President
Bush spoke in front of a "mission accomplished" banner but before plans
to stabilize and rebuild Iraq had been implemented. According to
Ferguson's film, it took the United States two years to plan its policy
to rebuild Germany after World War II; it took less than 60 days for
the U.S. to plan its policy to rebuild Iraq, much of it done by those
not fluent in the country's language or culture.

Many of the 35 talking heads interviewed by Ferguson, a Brookings
Institution policy wonk and software designer who self-financed the $2
million film, are or were high-ranking officials in the administration.
Some, like Col. Paul Hughes and Gen. Jay Garner, were from the
Pentagon. Others, likeBodine, came from the State Department.

With the exception of Walter Slocombe, adviser to the the Coalition Provisional Authority, which succeeded the ORHA, no one interviewed defends the U.S. decisions to "de-Ba'athify" Iraq and demobilize its army.

Garner looks stricken when he describes his unsuccessful fight against "de-Ba'athification,"
which eliminated 50,000 party members who could hold together Iraq's
fragile infrastructure. An even more stricken Hughes describes his
fight against dismantling the 500,000-member Iraqi army, which turned
potential U.S. allies into enemies who had access to weapons.

As Ferguson, who trained as a mathematician, conducts this audit of the
war in Iraq, he shows how those 500 mistakes led to 3,000 U.S.
casualties. Of Iraqi casualties, there is no reliable number, but
estimates range from 60,000 to 150,000.

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